Introduction
It is generally conceded by writers on sociological and political subjects that there is more or lese ambiguity in the use of the term "Public Opinion." A perueal of the literature yields almost as many definitions of the term as there are writers who use it. This fact would eeem to indicate a need for its clarification.
Many, if not most, of the standard definitions hold public opinion to be in the nature of a judgment, falling short of a demonstration but resulting from rational processes of publlo discussion. Giddings thinks of public opinion as "judgment of a eelf-oonsoioue community upon any subject of general inter est."^ Dicey states that public opinion is the result of "speculative views held by the mass of people as to the alteratlon or improvement of their institutions."
King defines put>-lie opinion at the "eoolal judgment reached upon a question of general or civic import after conscious rational public discus sion. *3 Lowell also imports Into the term an element of ration ality, although he does not think that the opinion need be rationally held by any given individual or group of individuals; he defines an opinion as "the acceptance of one among two or more inconsistent views which are capable of being aocepted by a rational mind as true," and public opinion as "an opinion ao-4 cepted by a considerable number of men."
In all these definl-4. Lowell, A. L. Publio Opinion in War and Peace, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936/ p. 13 tions public opinion involves discussion and, finally, judgment.
Recent attempts to clarify the term place less emphasis upon thought and discussion, stressing as well the sentimental or attltuainal factors. Lowell Juillard Carr, in his article, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept," has brought together various definitions and interpretations. He concludes that most writers conceive the term to mean the content of men's minds considered collectively. He says, however, that "such usage ig nores the phenomena of the psycho-social processes of whloh the content is a result, or at least a momentary configuration," 5. Carr, Lowell Juillard, "Public Opinion ae a Dynamic Concept," Sociology and Social Research. XIII, 1938-29, pp, 18-39 and he suggests that investigators equipped with dynamic rather than etatio categorise of observation take the field, Virginia Rankin Sedman states: "In the various approaches to the subject of public opinion, we find an impressive confueion of interpretations which defy any attempt to deal with it ae a uniformly defined entity."6 * She, too, brings together 6. Sedman, Virginia Rankin, "Some Interpretations of Publio Opinion," Social Forces. X, tfarch, 1932, pp. 339-350 3, numerous definitions and theories. From an analysis of such definitions and theories she has compiled a definition whioh she hopes may he all inolusive-or perhaps exclusive-inasmuch as it does not confuse the term with such concepts as public judgment, consensus of opinion, popular impression, puolio senti ment, and publio action. She defines puolio opinion as "an active or latent foroe derived from a composite of individual thoughts, sentiments, and impressions, which composite is weight ed by the varying degrees of influence and aggressiveness of the separate opinions within the aggregate.
7. Told.. p. 348
Differences 3xist not only in regard to the definition of the term, but also in regard to the formation and function of public opinion, Emory $. Bogardus thinka that public opinion is founded upon culture traits. He says,"The basis of public opinion is an £ priori culture or mores stage, hi^xly potential, but not in motion, In a very real sense the groundwork of pub lio opinion is the morse, characterized by definite convictions, accepted fully, but not often analyzed."9 William (Saver finds 8. Bogardus, Emory S., "Public Opinion as a Social Foroe,'4 Raos Reactions," Social Forces, VIII, September, 1939, pp. 103-5 that public opinion is formed according to "our belief as to what our feelings and opinions ought to be," that "society commits itself to many propositions that are by no means repre sentative of the way people actually think and feel."9 Norman 9. Gaver, William, "Credo at Work," Scribner1s Magazine. 83, July-December, 1927, p. 618 Meier contends that publio opinion is founded upon the basis of suggestion, imitation, and propaganda.Some writers con-10* Meier, Norman C«, "Motives in Voting,* American Jqurnal of Sociology, 31, July, 1935 -May, 1936 ceive the function of publio opinion to be spasmodic, active only in orlees; others see public opinion functioning contin uously and permanently.
Walter J. Millard, in addressing a meeting of the National Municipal League in Pittsburg in November, 1935, referred to Walter Llppmann'e concept of the stereotype as the greatest con tribution to our thinking in the sooial sciences that had been made during the last generation.This concept, as developed 11, Millard, Walter J ♦, quoted in 6ravea, Readings la Public Opinion, p-3 in Lippmann1® writing, throws considerable light upon the nature and functioning of public opinion and upon the processes incident to its control. Whether or not students of publio affairs, and of publio opinion as a factor in these affairs, agree with Millard in his uee of the superlative, it la evident from a study of the writing of these students that the majority regard Lippmann with respect' It may be profitable, therefore, to bring together all of Llppmann'e writings and, by careful analy sis, to discover his conception of the nature of opinion, the processes of its formation, and the role that it plays, and may play, in modern society.
Perhaps no writer has had a better opportunity to study public opinion, its nature, formation, and function than has Lippmann observes that we know only Indirectly the en vironment In which we live* Whatever seems to us to be a true picture, ws treat as the environment Itself* One can not have any feeling about an event he does not experience un less that feeling ie aroused by a mental image of that event* Living.in an environment as wide and as diversified as ours, knowledge of moat events le made up largely of Images. There fore, there exists a triangular relationship between the eoene I of action,^ the human picture of the scene, and the response to the picture working itself out upon the scene of action* There * is inserted between man and the real environment a pseudo-en vironment. It is to this pseudo-environment that his response la made* The confusion which frequently results is due to the fact that the response to the pseudo-environment is made In the real environment* The world beyond the reach of an individual becomes no lea8 his world because he has imaged what the unreachable part must be* Hie senseb cannot penetrate to all parts of the world, therefore It is In his mind that he sees, touohes, smells, hears, and remembers. The pictures which are formed in his mind become to him trustworthy pictures of the world beyond hie reach* This distinction between the "pictures in our heads" and the affaire of the "world outside" is basic to Lippmann,s definition of public opinion, as well as to his theory of the » ■ the outside world and how he shall see It. A large body of fact never reaohea him at all, or at beet, very ©lowly.
One may be conscious of hie Inability to understand the world outaide, but the time whioh he may apend in an attempt at understanding ie limited. If all the affaire of a particu lar country were related in detail, accurately, through the newspapers of that country, only a amall portion of the news papers in which the affairs were so recorded could be read.
Not only do censorship and privaoy at the source and physical and social barriers at the receiving end tend to limit the ease with whioh the pseudo-environment le built up, but lack of attention, poverty of language, the fact that we do not eee and then define, but define and then see-all tend to make the pseudo-environment different from the real environment. * Lippmann says that we tend to pick out what our culture has already defined for us and "we tend to perceive that which we have picked out, in the form of stereotypes, for us by our culture."13 Even trained observers fail, frequently, to re- ----------------------types is that which assumes that inanimate or oollective things have the attributes of human beings. We let the name of "England" come to mean all the people of England, and "John Bull" to stand for people and country combined.
It is true that stereotypes result in a great economy of effort and a saving of time. They are "ordered, more or less consistent pictures of the world to which our habits, our taetes, our capacities, our comforts, and our hopes have ad justed themselves. They may not be a complete picture of the world, but they are a. picture of a possible world to which we are adapted. In that world, people and things have their wellknown places, and do certain expected things. We feel at home there. 17c fit ln» ffQ are members. We know the way around. there is no public, or that it ie the public which ie the phan tom, says Dewey, but he thinks that the publio of democratic ideas le the phantom, Lippmann sees not one public, but many publics, which "although volatile, elusive, ignorant, and shy may by appropriate means be caught, precipitated, formed and 17 deformed, and be induoed occasionally to appear in publio,"* 17. Dewey, John, "Practical Democracy," New Republic, 45, November, 1935 -February, 1926 The public, composed of all citizens, and exerting a directing foroe in public affaire is, says Lippmann, "a mere phantom, it is an abstraction," The public is not a'fixed body of individuals. It is merely those persons who are inter ested in an affair and can affect it only by supporting or opla posing the actors."
Since his public has no fixed membership, Publio opinion, then, is manipulated. It does not sponta neously originate within a particular group, nor does it seem to grow without motivation by someone or some group* The inner cirole, those vitally interested, have found it compara tively easy to manipulate and educate public opinion* Methods of education and control vary according to the group and accord ing to the leader. Writers seem to agree in regard to the in struments whioh are used in reaching the public, the most impor tant of whioh is, perhaps, the press. Lippmann oalls the news paper the bible of democracy, out of which a people determine* its conduct. The radio, motion pictures, telephone and tele graph, schools, churches take more or less important parte ac cording to the particular public that is to be reached.
It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that those who have access to these instruments will be the ones who have the most influence in the formation of public opinion. It is these per sons whose work it is to arouse interest, to arrange for discus sions. This interest, says Lippmann, may be created, not by preaching, but by making the subjeot of publio opinion a part of 27 the business of life.
37. Stake* of Diplomacy, p. 198
That is all very well, but there must be some way in whioh the subject may be made a part of the busines* of life, a way in which grert numbers of people feeling privately on so many questions, develop a common thought. Lippmann »ays that it doe* not take an overeoul to crystallize out from the mass certain settled aims. This is done during every political campaign.
The attention of the people is first centered on eome symbol which is not objectionable to any individual, or to the different factions. This focusing point must be something which bring* out practically the same response in all persons, arousing in terest, and concentrating that interest. While this may not be an "Hegelian mystery," it is evident that a oertain type of leadership is needed to sense out the feeling of the publio and to analyze movements* The leaders must be recognized by the maee as having authority. They may be sohool offioiale, church officials, politicians, or others in more or less oonspicuous positions. They must, certainly, have the confidence of the publio and they must be believed when they attempt an interpretation of the environment to those who are not in touch with it.
It seems comparatively easy to trust those who are in the public eye, who are political leaders. Thus, the party organi zation becomes the souroe of information. Lippmann says that the reason for the party machine is not the "perversity of human nature. It is that out of the private notions of any 28 group no common idea emerges by itself."
A public, as such, 38. Publio Opinion, p. 329 may refuse to buy if prices are too high, or to work if wages are too low, or migrate, or boycott, or in other ways establish the right to joint control. It oannot, however, exercise that control except through some form of organization.
The number of times that we, as a public, consciously de cide anything about events beyond our reach is very small.
Since there are few practical issues, the habit of making deci sions is not formulated. The fact of indecision would be more evident, says Lippmann, were it not that most information, when it reaches ue, carries with it an aura of suggestion as to how we ought to feel about the news* We seek through the newspaper until we find that suggestion, and until we do find it, we are uncertain where we stand. We must have facte formulated so that we may say "Yes' or "No" in regard to them. A choice must be presented, and the ohoice must be connected with individual opinion by the transfer of interest through the symbols. Generally, however, a leader who ie astute and clever will seek 3ome element of consent. He will take certain persons of th9 mass into his confidence, enough into his confidence to make th8m feel that they have taken part in the plan. The en tire mass will not be able to appreciate the choices set forth by the leaders, for the leaders have the advantage in every respect* They have sources of information not open to the pub lic in general. They are in a position to meet the most im portant people. They have the responsibility. They can more easily secure attention, and they almost always assume a con vincing tone. They have control over the facto, and they de cide which facts shall be presented to the publio and how they shall be presented.. It is true that leaders secure consent, out they manipulate that consent, and while the public seeme to make the decision, it is a decision guided by a few.
That Lippmann feels that public opinion is formed by con Lippmann often asserts that the administration has an opportunity to affect public debate and public judgment. That advantage of such an opportunity is not utilized is poirted out in many of his editorials and magazine articles. Writing in the New York Tribune. he says, "Next week Congress will meet. The administration has had nine months of freedom from congressional criticism, nine months in which to mold a public opinion which would support measures needed to meet the world crisis. Is there any evidence that it has eucceeded in align ing a public opinion behind it on which it can count during the critical months ahead." He feels that such evidence is lacking, that the prevailing opinion in Washington at the time he wrote was exactly what it had been nine months previous, that the administration could take no far reaching steps be cause it was not sure of the support of public opinion. For more than two years the administration has been working with other powers, but it has never once.explained its work to the nubile. It, the a<br.lniatr=:ricn does net know whether it can pledge the nation to any of the doctrines which It hae been considering; it is waiting for some sign from a public which has never been instructed and informed. While the publio waits for some sign from administrative officials, those same officials are treating the present uninstructed publio opinion as final. This is a different attitude than the one taken by the government during the war crisis. Then, Lippmann says, the government conscripted public opinion. Officials goosestepped it, taught it to stand at attention and salute.
Decisions in the modern state tend to be made by the in teraction, not of Congress and the Executive, but of public opinion and the Executive. Public opinion, for this purpose, finds itself oollected about special groups, a labor group, a farmer group. These groups conduct a continuous electioneering campaign upon the uninformed, exploitable public. Being special groups, they have special sources of information. Very frequent' ly the information is simply manufactured to fit the need. It would seem, says Lippmann, that the sources of opinion must be carefully protected if the resulting public opinion is to be of Perhaps the entire matter of the formation of publio opin ion, as far as lippmann'3 concept is concerned, is to be found in his statementi "Uy conclusion is that public opinion must be organized fox* the press if it is to be sound, not by the 3? press as it is today." 3?. Ibid., p. 32
Part III
The Function of Public Opinion
•The action of a public,* saye Lippmann, "is principally confined, to an occasional intervention in affairs by means of « an alignment of the force which a dominant section of that public can wield. 38. Phantom Public, p. 60 What the public really does is to align itself for or against a proposal. It dees not express its opinions. It can not do so by simply answering "Yes" and "Ko." In saying that the popular will does not direot continuously, but intervenes only occasionally, we are advocating that the people themselves do not govern, but mobilize, ae a majority, to support or to oppose the individuals who govern. The members of a publio can not possess the intimate knowledge of affairs that those who are within the inner cirole possess. They cannot understand the fine points of the argument. They can but wait for some sign which will indicate behind which actor, which leader, to mobi lize. They cannot anticipate the problem much before it has reached the crisis stage, nor do they mull over the problem when that stage is passed.
Public opinion is not a conserving or creating force, di recting society to clearly conoeived ends, or taking a deliberate stand toward any preconceived goal and then working consistently and unchecked toward that goal. It does not continuously direot the affaire of the world* It is only when these affaire meet with a enag that public opinion intervenes, and then it does not "deal with the substance of the problem, or make teohnical Lippmann doea not concede that public opinion makes the law any more than it ohooees the candidate. It does, he says, when the law is presented to it, either affirm or deny ite worth* It does, by giving assent to certain candidates, say that this roan shall make the law instead of that man. So long as the laws which are made operate smoothly and inoffen sively, the public does not Interfere. It is only when the power of certain persons to make the law has been challenged that the public intervenes.
If we depended upon the entire roass of people to make the law, we should be a nation without law. It ie impossible for the public to govern directly. The only interest that the mass has in governing ie to aee that there are laws, that these laws funotion, and that when they cease to funotion, naw laws are substituted. As a people, we are not interested in the law it self, out only in enforcing the law; in the maintenance of a regime of rule, contract, and custom; in *law, * not in laws; in the method of law, not in the substance; in the sanctity of contract, not in a particular contract. The pressure which the public brings to bear through praise and blame, through votes, strikes, boycotts, or support can yield results only if it re enforces the men who enforce an old rule or sponsor.a new one.
The public does not consider any one system of rules sacred and cares only that some system be enforced. It doee not Inter fere unless there is some question as to validity of the rules, as to enforcement, as to meaning. Then, it requires that cer tain objective tests be applied. The public is not a dispenser of law and morals, but a reserve force that may be called into U36 during tne poor functioning of the existing laws and morals. 41, Ibid., There is considerable talk about the education of the gen eral public in order that there may be a dependable public opin ion. Lippmann feels that it is in the elementary Btate schools that suoh education should logically start. It is impossible, he says, circumstances being as they are, to educate above the 42 level of the prejudices of the whole state citizenry. He 42. Lippmann, Walter, American Inquisitore. Hew York, The Macmillan Company, 1928, p. 34 says, further, that we cannot imagine that the trusts will drift naturally into the service of human life; the people can compel such service. Eut there will have to be an adjustment in think ing, and this adjustment will not come undirected.
That there is potency in an organized public opinion ie evident in the weight it has with oertain of the leading actors on the stage of public affairs. In his Men of Destiny. Lippmann says of William McAdoo: *He, of all men, has incomparably the greatest sensibility to the prevailing winds of public opinion.
He ie organized by a remarkable sense of what the governing majority of voters wants and will receive.* Of Herbert Hoover, he has this to say: "Hoover, lacking stimulation from the mass, advances opinions from a few stock ideas." Comparing the two, he says that McAdoo is less intricate personally, but infinitely 45 more sensitive to the stimulus of popular feeling.
Men Of Destiny, p. 118
The popular feeling is that if one can secure a hearing in public opinion, the cause which he represents will be more cer tain of ultimate success. Lippmann tells ua that organized labor spends large sums of money trying to enforce its will, but such efforts are generally unsuccessful because it does not have 44 an opportunity to secure a genuine hearing in public opinion.
Liberty and the News, p. 103
No one can work at his best, nor secure the best results if he knows that he is constantly having to fight public disfavor.
The press, or rather those who control the press, are always on the alert for the approval or disapproval of different publics.
Lippmann thinks that in the repression of the news no financial power is "one-tenth" so corrupting, so insidious, so hostile to originality and frank statement ae the "fear of the public who reads the magazine. For one item suppressed out of respect for a railroad or a bank, nine are rejected because of the prejudice of the public. This will anger the farmer, that will 45 arouse the Cathclice, another will shock the summer girl." 45. Preface to Polltios. p. 196 The public has a function. It must form methods of its own in controversies. It must conform to certain principles.
It must confine the efforts of its members to a play which they can play, merely to an intervention whioh will resul* in an allaying of the disturbance and so let them, the members, go on with their own affaire.
wX,

Part IV Teste
It has already been said that Lippmann feels that there is no question for the public unless there is doubt as to the validity of a rule,, doubt about its meaning, its soundness, or the method ox its application. When doubt exists, the public requires simple, objective teste to help it decide where it will enliet. These tests must answer two questions: Is the rule defective, and how shall the agency be recognized which is most likely to mend it?
Since the membership of the public ia not fixed, changing with the issue, there is a drifting tack and forth between the field where oertain individuals are executives and the field where they are members of the public. There is confusion as to whether the attitudes of these individuals are public at titudes or private attitudes. The public point of view is hard to detect, it is confused by the presence of those percone who a re working to shape opinion, to bend the rule in their favor while pretending, or even imagining, that they are interested only in the public good and in the existence of a workable rule. It is essential that this self-interested group be recognized and that its actions bs discounted. The members of the self-interested group will not aid in the search. There fore, it devolves upon the members of the public. They must * insist on debate. They, the members of the publio, will not be able to decide the question on the merits of the arguments presented, but they will be watching the exposure of the eelfintereeted group in the discussion, The debate will most fre quently not lead to an answer to the question debated, but it will tend to expose the partisan group. This identification 46 is the true purpose of the debate. The tests of assent and of conformity will determine when there is a need for reform. The only way the publio can choose between the Ins and the Outs ie to depend., upon cumulative judgment as to whether problems are being solved or aggravated.
However, wholesale judgments are not to be depended upon for final action. They must be broken up into more "retail" judg ments. The people must locate by clear and objective teste the actor in a controversy who should be given support* / The only test applicable in so locating this deserving ac tor, is the teat of inquiry. The party who is willing to sub mit hie claim to inquiry ie generally adjudged to be the most sincere, most confident in his stand, most willing to risk his platform for the good of the people. If the parties to a dispute are willing to submit to an inquiry, there is some prospect of a settlement. Failing settlement, there is a ohance for clarification of the point at issue, and failing clarification, there is the possibility that the most arbitrary of the disputants will be identified.
But, if all the parties submit to inquiry, the test of inquiry is valueless. The only thing which is accomplished ia that the disputants may be identified. Other tests must be ap plied to ascertain whether the new rule ie workable* These tests must ascertain whether the rule provides for its own clari fication, whether or not it provides for amendment by consent, and whether or not it provides that due notice shall be given 47 before amendment is made. although these wholesale judgments may be refined by more ana lytical teste for specific issues. As samples for these more analytical teets I have suggested the test of inquiry for con fused controversies, and for reforms, the test of interpreta-,48 tion, of amendment, of due notice.* 43. Ibid.. p. 140
Lippmann does not claim that these tests are infallible, nor that they may not be improved upon. He doee,suggest, how ever that where the members of a public cannot use tests of this sort to guide them, the wisest course for them ie not to act. The existence of a usable teat is itself the test of whether the public ought to intervene.
There are certain principles underlying the tests proposed by Lippmann. Briefly, these are:
1. Executive action is not for the public.
3. The intrinsic merits of the question are not for the publio.
3. The anticipation, the analysis, and the solution of a question are not for the public.
4. The apeciflo, technical, intimate oriteria required in the handling of a question are not for the public.
5. What is left for the public is a judgment as to whether the actors in the controversy are following a settled rule of behavior or their own arbitrary desires.
6. This judgment is dependent upon the discovery of 
38.
Conclusion
It le difficult to find outstanding contributions of any one writer in a subject on which so many authorities write and which is conoeded to be one of the most important subjects of the day# So far as I have been able to ascertain, Lippmann is the first writer to make uee of the concept of stereotypes in his definition of public opinion# The triangular relation ship which he finds exists between the scene of action, the human pioture of the scene, and the response to the picture working itself out upon the scene of action is dearly a Lippmann concept. Others concede the value of the concept and make use of it, but it is to Walter Lippmann that all writers give credit# Lippmann is convinced that there is not one public, but many publics, each interested in its own problems, and while the members of the different publics may be the same individuals, each public seems to be concerned only with its problems. He builds up the personnel of his pu'olios in rather a unique man ner# To him anyone who is seeking to learn from the public, who proposes to the members plane to employ, in their most produc tive and harmonious form, the energies of man, is a member. The public ie made up of those whose interest in any question leads them to align themselves on the side of any of the main actors.
He does not concede the existence of a "collective mind." A public's will is made up of many wills, and when a public speaks, it speaks through some person. He conoeivea publio opinion to a be, then, the voice of the interested spectators of action transmitted through some person.
He emphasizes the fact that public opinion is not sponta neously formed within the group, that it must be directed, edu cated, before it is capable of use. He sees, in the formation of opinion, the part played by the dual aspect of human nature.
Interest is at the basis of opinion, and the self which is in the ascendancy when the question is being discussed is the self which is or is not influenced. The making of one general will out of a multitude of individual wills consists essentially in the use of symbols which assemble emotions after they have been detached fi*om their ideals. The change is brought about by leaders who have access to the instruments of public opinion.
The function of public opinion is to intervene in a cri sis. It is not a directing force, nor is it a creating force.
It simply offers a solution in a conflict by aligning men in such a way as to baok the leaders most capable of effecting a settlement of difficulties. Publio opinion does not make the law. It approves or disapproves the advocates of the law and so affirms or denies its worth. The publio is not a dispenser of law and morals. It Is a reserve force that may be called into play during the poor functioning of existing laws or morals. In order that publio opinion may function properly, it must be given to the instruments through which it works in *3
an organized fora, not left to be organized by such instruments.
It must, in other words, be organized for the press instead of by-the press.
There should be an Independent, expert organization which is capable of making unseen facts known to those who must de cide the issue. Besides the experts to organize public opinion, Lippmann suggests that there should also be experts to direct the force whioh public opinion wields. The business of the public, then, is to decide whether the actors are following certain established rules, whether an existing rule of action is defeotive, and if so, who is best suited to remedy the defeot
The public must have certain objective tests to guide it in making decisions. The tests of assent, oonformity, and inquiry may be applied. A rule is considered defective when the majority of the people no longer assent or conform to it. Per sona beet suited to remedy a defective rule are those who are willing to submit to an impartial inquiry into the facts and who will abide by the results of an inquiry which provides for self-clarification, amendment, and due notice of change. In most cases the Outs are supported against the Ins.
It is possible, indeed highly probable, that another stu dent, or other students, will find additional contributions made by Walter Lippmann, or they may not agree that the phases which have been discussed are the phases of most value to an understanding of the subject of public opinion. It has been my purpose to isolate, so far as isolation is possible, those ideas which seem to oe peculiarly Lippmann's, those ideas which are most frequently quoted by other writers in the field. Cer tainly, to me, the outstanding contributions of Walter Lippmann to an understanding of the subject of public opinion are:
(l) Stereotypes, the pictures in our heads, form the basis for the formation of opinions, (2) Opinions should be organ ized for the press by experts and the weight, cr force, which opinions are to exert should be controlled by experts. (3) It is the function of public opinion to operate only in a crisis and to operate by aligning the public on the particular question, behind the actors. (4) Objective teste, to ascertain whether or not the situation justifies public intervention, should be applied.
If we, as students, might incorporate these ideas into our concept of public opinion, it seems to me that we should have something on which to build, some point of departure, and that we might better understand the working of public opinion and the force which it has, or which it may have, in public affairs.
